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Introduction
The theory of mind is certainly necessary. The dire consequences of a missing theory of mind in
autism spectrum disorders are a clear proof for it. So, it might be interesting to examine how it is
necessary and useful by looking at some specific (and possible) functions in the mind of a child as
well as of an adult, beyond the more general comprehension of one’s own and others’ mental state.
First of all, as the field of the theory of mind is full of different approaches, we want to specify,
very schematically, our point of view about this topic.
1. The theory (naïve) of mind is based upon the capacity to think about thoughts as such, to
represent the representations regardless of the “objective” reality (meta-representative thought).
The analysis of the results of the common cognitive test for studying this topic, the famous false
belief task, shows that, regarding the representations of others, a correct meta-representation
has to desist from reality as well as from one’s own representation: “I know X, but I understand
that you know Y.” In our opinion, the meta-representative thought is the cognitive process that
generates the decentralized thought (vs. the egocentric thought); in other words the ability to
adopt the cognitive perspective of someone else. However, the meta-representative thought can
be pointed not only towards the external world and to other people, constituting the basis of
interpersonal relations, but also towards the internal world, i.e., to one’s own representations,
thus constituting the basis of consciousness and meta-cognition. Summarizing, one could say
that the theory of mind is the basis for the representation of the world of subjectivity (we have
exposed these concepts more broadly in Battacchi et al., 1998).
2. When talking about everyday thinking, we must remember that people not always reason
according to the formal logic, but often activate cognitive processes that are less rational and
affected by important biases (heuristics, analogical thinking, etc...). We can apply this well-
known principle also to the meta-representative thought. This is certainly a complex thought
that we would be able to use, but that we don’t necessarily use in every situation of daily life.
Indeed it’s easy to notice (and even to demonstrate, as had been done in some cases, Keisar et al.,
2003; Bloom and Birch, 2007; Keisar, 2007; Ryskin and Brown-Schmidt, 2014) that in daily life
people very often violate the properties of the meta-representative thought, as the ones that we
have indicated above.
Massaro et al. (2013), for example, investigated the so-called outcome bias and hindsight bias in
primary school children and explored the possible predictive function of false belief understanding
in reducing these biases.
This is why our basic question should sometimes be: “How useful would the theory of mind be?”
From this point of view, we believe it could be interesting to address two specific topics: one is what
we will call the “naïve realism,” the other is “ignorance,” once more of one’s own as well as of others.
We belief in fact that the theory of mind, as meta-representative thought, can contribute to reduce
the bias of naïve realism and to increase the meta-cognitive awareness of one’s own and others’
ignorance and that these functions can have relevant social implications.
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The Naïve Realism
Back in 1926, J. Piaget described in a very short passage
the meaning of his first, by now almost forgotten studies
about infantile representations. When representing the world, a
thought (not only of children) can be objective or realistic. It is
objective when “it recognizes (...) the manifold intrusions of the
ego into our everyday thoughts and the thousands of illusions that
derive from it—illusions of senses, of language, of points of view,
of values, etc.—which start to get rid of the obstacles of the ego
before venturing a guess.” On the other hand, a realistic way of
thinking “consists in ignoring the presence of the ego, which is
in considering one’s own perspective as immediately objective and
absolute. Therefore, realism is (...) all the countless illusions that
pervade the history of science.”
The most famous Italian novel of the nineteenth century,
I promessi sposi (“The Betrothed”) by Alessandro Manzoni,
contains a very effective literary image of this concept. Manzoni
tells the story of plague that haunted the city of Milan in
1630: back then, it was assumed that the epidemic had been
caused by some suspicious characters, the so-called greasers, who
greased walls and doors with a deadly substance. Renzo, the
main character of the novel, is mistaken for a greaser because
of some of his actions; he gets denounced and chased by the
bulk. Manzoni then tells us that in later years people started to
contest this myth of the greasers, and that the passer-by who
had denounced Renzo argued that “one must have seen things.”
By using the verb “to see,” Manzoni, a very subtle psychologist
ante litteram, wants to exclude the fact that in the mind of
that alas nameless person there wasn’t even the slightest doubt
about his representations as well as the slightest awareness of the
“manifold intrusions of the ego into everyday thinking,” as said
Piaget (1926).
It seems obvious that these words can by referred to
extremely broad fields of knowledge: from the problems of
micro- and macro-social relations (which are right now in
some way particularly relevant) to the problems of epistemology
(naive as well as scientific). Moreover, the awareness of one’s
subjectivity is always essential for recognizing the subjectivity of
others.
This topic can also be connected to another classical theory
of modern psychology: the theory of attribution (Heider, 1958).
One of the most important cognitive procedures is without doubt
the search for the causes of events and behaviors. We know that
we can ascribe the actions of someone (and also of ourselves) to
internal causes (abilities, motivations, etc.) as well as to external
causes (the characteristics of objects, the behaviors of others, the
chance, etc.). We know as well that there is a general tendency
to overestimate the internal causes, to see ourselves as governed
by ourselves or to prefer internal or external attributions as
a means of valorizing and defending the image of ourselves.
Today, we have the instruments for measuring the attributional
processes and for documenting their importance for a person’s
adaptation and wellbeing. The most famous example is certainly
the concept of locus of control. Less known and less documented,
but nevertheless highly plausible is the hypothesis of a tendency
to belief realistic the representations which regulate the more or
less problematic relationships with the other, the different one,
etc. A slightly more sophisticated meta-representative thought
would allow us to get aware of the fact that some of our trusted
representations (that seem to be completely “objective”) are
nothing else than the result of our “attributions,” based on certain
heuristics well known in social psychology. This is why we can
ask ourselves if a metacognitive consciousness of the internal
components of our representations could be useful to control the
social stereotypes which are the basis of the hostile relationships
typical of our societies.
The Representation of Ignorance
In our opinion, there is another important topic related to meta-
representation which does not get the attention it deserves,
maybe because it is a kind of “non-representation.” We are
referring to “ignorance,” i.e., absence of knowledge. Ignorance
is a cognitive condition that we experience daily and that we
consider as nothing more than a limit that has to be eliminated.
If there is something we do not know, we look for information;
or if there is someone who doesn’t know something, we try
to give him the necessary information. But reality is not as
simple. If ignorance itself can be seen as something negative,
the metacognitive awareness of ignorance can, on the contrary,
be considered as an important and very “useful” condition. The
philosopher Nicholas of Cusano (1440) referred to this in his
famous oxymoron “de docta ignorantia”: in front of the immense
wisdom of God, we become aware of the limits of our thoughts.
In an attempt to secularize this concept, we could say that the
awareness of the limits of our knowledge would be a sign of
great intellectual (as well as academic) virtue—just in the sense
of Socrates and his “knowing to know nothing.” On the contrary,
the illusion of knowing everything is the royal road to ignorance
and stupidity.
Our Ignorance
Even in a metacognitive sense, the awareness of one’s ignorance is
the necessary condition for every kind of learning (Rohwer et al.,
2012). When do we “decide” that we know enough so that we can
stop asking and learning? Which is the level of comprehension
that we consider as sufficient and that leads us to stop searching?
It is obvious that even the most simple of topics can never
be studied and known in all of its details. Our meta-decisions
depend on our meta-representation of our relative ignorance, as
well as on other factors, first of all the necessity of daily routines,
but also the image of ourselves, the comparison with others, etc.
We can also assume that people differ in their level of tolerated
ignorance: there are those who content themselves with fairly
superficial skills and explanations in the illusion to eliminate their
ignorance as easily as possible, and there are those who use their
ignorance as a means to go on looking for a deeper knowledge.
And it is exactly in this, until now only partially explored research
area that we see a big potential for new studies connected with the
topic of meta-representative thought.
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The Ignorance of Others
The ignorance of others is part of our everyday life: when
we communicate something to someone, we do this mostly
because we assume that the other does not know it yet and
that we have to consider, in an implicit and maybe unconscious
way, his or her ignorance. This means that we are capable of
representing it to ourselves. Besides, ignorance is also the specific
object of numerous important professions: teachers, journalists,
technicians (when they must sharing their knowledge with the
novice), etc. The main problem of these professions is a correct
representation of ignorance: what is the state of mind of the
person who ignores what I have to teach him? What does he
know, and what does he not know? What are his cognitive
abilities, and which ones does he not have? Representing the
mental representation of a person who does not know something
is probably one of the most difficult cognitive operations at all. It
is all about taking on the perspective of someone else with regard
to a topic that we know well, and the first, necessary but not
sufficient step is that of ignoring what we know. This is certainly
the main difficulty of teaching in every form and at every level.
What does a child know about the world that we are supposed
to explain? What are his strange representations of it? Many
years ago, a boy attending the first year of junior high school, a
really good student, could not understand how a river can flow
northward; the only way to explain it was to take down the map
from the wall, to spread it out on the floor and to allow the boy to
walk on it.
It might interesting to remember that Piaget based his research
method on the analysis of mistakes.
Are the mistakes of our students false representations that one
has to get rid of as soon as possible, or are they a precious source
for understanding their relative “ignorance”?
Road signs are another funny example: when a passer-by asks
for the right direction, giving him a useful answer implies that we
identify ourselves with his ignorance—something that those who
are in charge of road signs are not always capable of doing.
Our everyday experience shows that explaining the
functioning and use of an instrument to a non- professional
is a very difficult task for technicians in every field—we see
this by the countless obscure user manuals (Serra Barneto,
1992). Even in this not all too trivial field, meta-representation
could be very useful for keeping in mind the ignorance of
others.
In conclusion, we can briefly highlight that the theory of mind
and the meta-cognition are not only important mechanisms of
information processing but they represent overall the essential
tools of every kind of interpersonal communication.
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